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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. Our motivation for this paper comes from two observations. Firstly,
economic theory predicts that it should be di¢ cult to sustain cooperation due to free riding
and moral hazard problems. Yet in practice, there seems to be considerably more cooperation
than the theoretical prediction suggests. For example, consider the Lifeboat institute, which
manages fast and e¢ cient rescue at sea, despite relying on voluntary contributions to pay for
lifeboats and volunteers to man them. There are many other examples. Experimental evidence
shows a similar story. In experiments, subjects are much more cooperative than conventional
economic theory would predict. 4
The second observation is that in many economic situations probabilities are not given.
Moreover it is not an easy task to assign meaningful probabilities to the relevant events.
Formally we refer to situations in which probabilities are poorly dened as ambiguous. In
the presence of ambiguity people tend to behave cautiously. In particular, they place more
weight on bad outcomes than an expected utility maximiser would. We call this pessimism or
ambiguity aversion.
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2We relate these two observations by showing that pessimism can be exploited to sustain co-
operation in partnerships with ambiguous actions. Ambiguity can make threats more e¤ective.
The argument suggests that ambiguous threats can be exploited to sustain cooperation.
1.2. Evidence. There have been many experiments on choice under uncertainty. 5 The
strongest conclusions which can be obtained from this literature are as follows.
1. Compared to Savages subjective expected utility theory, people over-weight unlikely
events and under-weight likely events, 6
2. The less familiar the source of uncertainty, the more cautiously individuals behave.
This results in less over-weighting of unlikely events and more under-weighting of likely
events. 7
The psychological intuition behind this is that people are relatively insensitive to changes
in probability, other than changes between possibility and impossibility. Thus an increase
in probability from 0 to 5% is given much greater weight than an increase from 50 to 55%.
As subjective expected utility is linear in probabilities, it predicts the two changes should be
equivalent.
Our model aims to incorporate the key features of this evidence. We have focused on
the under-weighting of large probabilities and the e¤ects of familiarity of source, which will
cause individuals to behave pessimistically. Under-weighting produces preferences which place
more emphasis on bad outcomes. The missingprobability mass tends to be assigned to bad
outcomes rather than to specic events. For analytic simplicity we have abstracted from the
over-weighting of small events.
There is less evidence on the e¤ect of ambiguity in games. The available evidence seems
loosely supportive of our argument. Consider the ultimatum bargaining game. As is well
known, player 1 will o¤er player 2 approximately half the pie in experiments on this game.
This is in contrast to the sub-game perfect equilibrium, in which player 1 keeps virtually all of
5See e.g. Ellsberg (1961) and Camerer and Weber (1992).
6See Gonzalez and Wu (1999).
7See Kilka and Weber (1998).
3the pie for himself. The dictator and impunity games are similar to the ultimatum bargaining,
except that player 1 is completely protected against retaliation. 8 In such games player 1 tends
to behave in selsh ways, which are quite close to the predictions of economic models. Thus
player 1 cooperates when player 2 has an ambiguous threat. When the ambiguity is removed
cooperation ceases.
Public reactions to environmental scares show similar patterns to the laboratory evidence
discussed above. Consider the public reactions to BSE, which has never been a major cause
of death or illness, even compared to other sources of contamination in food. Yet it provoked
a widespread scare, even in countries with minimal exposure to BSE. It does not seem unrea-
sonable to argue that this reaction was due to ambiguity surrounding a new disease. In some
cases, the panic was greater in countries less exposed to the disease. It is highly suggestive
that the panic was caused by ambiguity, as in those countries the risk was less familiar. This
appears to show a similar pattern to the laboratory evidence discussed above. A likely but
unfamiliar event, that BSE does not pose a signicant risk to the vast majority of people, is
under-weighted. The shortfall is assigned to the bad outcome.
1.3. Outline of the Paper. A brief account of the background of our model is provided
in Section 2. We both discuss basic models of partnerships and the ideas of Knight (1921)
concerning ambiguity and entrepreneurs. The basic intuition of our model, which combines
both strands, is outlined. Additional examples are discussed for which its logic applies. In
Section 3 our representation of ambiguity is described. We generalize the concept of Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies for this framework. The model of a partnership is presented in
Section 4 and the entrepreneurial sharing rule is introduced.
In Section 5 this sharing rule is illustrated by a simple example. Conditions under which any
equilibrium is ex-post or ex-ante e¢ cient are stated in Section 6. The ex-post e¢ cient outcome
can be implemented, even when the partners have identical beliefs about the (aggregate)
behaviour of the others. In Section 7 concluding remarks are made. We briey discuss some
broader questions our approach may raise. These concern the role of rationality, ambiguity in
8See Bolton and Zwick (1995), Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994) and Hofman, McCabe, Shacat
and Smith (1994).
4a dynamic framework and optimism. Most technical material is gathered in the Appendix.
2. Partnerships
2.1. The Role of Partnerships. Questions concerning optimal contracts for sharing the
prots of partnerships are interesting both from a theoretical and from an applied perspective.
From the practical point of view, partnerships play a role in everyday life in the ways lawyers,
accountants, management consultants and doctors organize their rms. They can even be
found in cooperation treaties of coalition governments, in multi-national organizations and
in nancial systems. From the theoretical point of view, two aspects are prominent. On
the one hand, there is the problem of mechanism design, focusing on the implementation of
e¢ cient outcomes in groups of agents. In this context, the problem is that some individual
characteristics of agents are private information. Agents may have an incentive to mimic the
optimal behaviour of agents with di¤erent characteristics. An example is the free rider problem
in the provision of public goods.
On the other hand, there is a moral hazard problem when the actions of the di¤erent
partners fail to be observable or it is not possible to write an enforceable contract on them.
As is usual in the literature on partnerships, we focus on this moral hazard problem with
multiple agents that arises within the partnership. The individual characteristics of the agents
are assumed to be common knowledge.
2.2. Implementing the E¢ cient Outcome. The analysis focuses on the kind of part-
nerships that are most problematic. These are partnerships where the agents are identical
and the production function is linear and symmetric. When some shirking takes place, it is
impossible to identify the shirker or even a strict subset of agents that contains the shirker(s). 9
When the partnership can commit to destroying part of the production, there is an easy
way to implement the e¢ cient outcome. A contract can be used, that assigns each agent an
equal share of the produced good if the e¢ cient production level is obtained. Otherwise no
payment is made. But it may be di¢ cult to commit to actually destroying the output if the
9 If in the case of unilateral shirking it is possible to identify some team within the partnership that contains
the (unique) shirker, then it may be possible to implement the e¢ cient outcome. This is discussed in Nandeibam
(1997).
5target is missed. The agents have an incentive to renegotiate and divide the produced goods
between them. Some agents may anticipate this and choose to shirk, trusting to end up with
a part of the output without facing the corresponding cost of e¤ort.
Alternatively, the following contract may be considered. One member of the partnership
is designated to be the budget breaker, who does not produce. Each other agent obtains an
equal share of the produced good if the e¢ cient production level is reached. Whenever the
total production is smaller, the budget breaker obtains the output and the other agents get
nothing. Thus, it allows the latter in a clever way to destroyproduction. This solution is
in the spirit of Holmström (1982).
The solution has two drawbacks. Firstly, as observed by Haller (1985), it falls short of
implementing the e¢ cient outcome since the budget breaker does not produce. For large
partnerships, however, the per agent shortfall from the e¢ cient payo¤ is small. Secondly, as
Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) argue, the budget breaker may form a coalition with some other
agent. They may agree that this agent is to shirk to ensure the budget breaker obtains the
total production of the others. The proceeds are then divided between them. Andolfatto and
Nosal (1997), however, note that such coalition may fail to form. After the agent shirked, the
budget breaker has an incentive to renege on the promised side-payment. 10
2.3. Partnership Puzzles. The intuition captured in the above gives rise to some puzzles.
Certain partnerships are organized in a way that should lead to more shirking instead of less.
One class of examples are entrepreneur owned rms. In such rms the entrepreneur hires
workers and pays their wages. Otherwise he is the residual claimant of the prots. In countries
with rigid redundancy laws, the workers do not face an immediate threat of dismissal when
they shirk. Theory suggests this should not provide good incentives. By the same token,
less shirking should be expected in small collectively owned enterprises. Casual observation
suggests that in reality the opposite is true. We propose that the presence of ambiguity may
explain such puzzles.
In entrepreneur owned rms, workers face ambiguity about the e¤ort provided by the
10For other solutions to the problem see, e.g., Rasmusen (1987), Legros and Matsushima (1991) and
dAsperment and Gérard-Varet (1998).
6entrepreneur. An entrepreneur is a specialist in dealing with the uncertainties of the market,
e.g., in recognizing new opportunities for prot. Employees typically lack the entrepreneurial
skills of judgement. So even when workers have a fair idea about the time an entrepreneur
spends in his rm, this fails to reveal the quality of the entrepreneurial input. Therefore, it
does not help them to resolve their ambiguity about the entrepreneurs e¤ort.
2.4. Entrepreneurs and Ambiguity. The role of entrepreneurs in the organization of
production when ambiguity prevails is discussed extensively in Knight (1921, Chapter IX).
Regarding the role of entrepreneurs he is of the opinion that 11
: : :there must come into play the diversity among men in degree of con-
dence in their judgement and powers and disposition to act upon their opinion,
to venture: : :
: : :the condent and venturesome assume the risk or insure the doubtful
and timid by guaranteeing the latter a specied income in return for an assignment
of the actual results. 12
In Knights view, entrepreneurs are people who are more willing to bear ambiguity. This
could be because they have better powers of judgement and experience less ambiguity in a
given situation, or because they are less averse to it. This is conrmed by research. It provides
three di¤erent types of explanations why entrepreneurs may be overly condent or optimistic.
The rst suggests that the more condent self-select to be entrepreneurs. 13 In an evolutionary
process irrational overcondent entrepreneurs may persist. 14 Alternatively, it has been shown
that it may be in the interest of rm owners to hire overcondent optimist managers. As the
agency costs for such managers are less than for rational managers, overcondent optimists
may be hired, even when they are less capable. 15
Another aspect of the organization of production mentioned by Knight (1921, p. 356) is
that
11Knight (1921, pp. 269-270).
12 It seems, although the text reads risk, it is ambiguitythat is referred to.
13This is the basic idea of Rigotti and Ryan (1997). They argue entrepreneurs self-select to be less inuenced
by the sources of ambiguity.
14See Bernardo and Welch (2001).
15See Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2000).
7: : :specialized skills and training: : :are acquired in connection with and for use
in the particular business. The cost of acquisition is borne chiey by the worker
and if the business is unprotable, the loss generally falls on him.
We propose a class of sharing rules for partnerships with strategic ambiguity, which to
some extent incorporate these properties. We call them entrepreneurial sharing rules. One
of the partners is assigned a position similar to that of a Knightian entrepreneur. He insures
the income of the others, as long as it cannot be proven that they all shirked. If, however, it
can be proven that each of the other partners did shirk, then they pay him a ne. This ne
can, e.g., be a reimbursement for the loss of investment in partnership specic capital.
2.5. The Intuition. In a two person partnership with an entrepreneurial sharing rule, the
following may happen. With some condence, the worker correctly expects the entrepreneur
to put in the agreed e¤ort. But due to ambiguity, he does not completely rule out that the
latter may shirk. Should the entrepreneur fail to provide any e¤ort, shirking by the worker can
be proven and he is ned for it. If the worker does not shirk, he is paid his wage, independent
of the e¤ort of the entrepreneur. Whenever he faces su¢ cient ambiguity that the entrepreneur
provides the agreed e¤ort, the worker refrains from shirking. The reason is that ambiguity
increases the weight he places on the bad outcome, i.e., on being ned.
Suppose, in contrast, the entrepreneur is su¢ ciently condent that the worker does not
shirk. As a consequence, he has to pay the workers wage and obtains the output of the
partnership. The best he can do is to choose his e¢ cient e¤ort level. As a result, neither the
worker nor the entrepreneur shirks and the e¢ cient outcome is implemented.
2.6. Other Examples. The logic of entrepreneurial sharing rules and the results we obtain
apply more generally than to entrepreneur-owned rms. Other applications can be found in
the realm of international politics. Firstly, consider military alliances as NATO or the rst
Gulf war coalition against Iraq. One common feature is, that shirking of a small number of its
members had the potential to end in an unfavourable outcome. Another feature is the strong
involvement and leadership of the USA, who e¤ectively acted as a political residual claimant.
According to the logic of cooperation in partnerships, this is about the worst way to organize
8a partnership. Under a sharing rule with a residual claimant, the other partners have every
incentive to shirk. None-the-less, these partnerships were extremely successful.
Things were even more puzzling in the Kosovo crisis. Initially, the Europeans wanted to
solve this problem amongst themselves in a partnership of equals. The result was a lot of
political wrangling, a form of shirking. When the USA came in and took the lead things
improved rapidly. Although it acted as a political residual claimant, only after the USA got
involved did the partnership start to function e¤ectively.
We argue that these apparent paradoxes can be explained by the model introduced in
this paper. In these examples the partners face ambiguity about the e¤ort provided by the
governments to endure the tensions caused by the confrontation with the Warsaw pact, Iraq
and Serbia respectively. The political pay-o¤s of the partnerships were divided according to
the entrepreneurial sharing rule. The USA had the position of the entrepreneur, almost being
a residual claimant.
In the second war against Iraq the main di¤erence was that the USA was eager from the
start not to allow any ambiguity with respect its to intentions. In the absence of ambiguity
about its e¤orts, the initial support in the Security Council soon evaporated.
Other examples can be found in the context of interbank lending. Here the partners are
the commercial banks and the regulator, typically the central bank. The latter is the residual
claimant vis-a-vis the former. As noted in Rochet and Tirole (1996), central banks are known
to pursue a strategy of constructive ambiguity to discourage shirking by their commercial
partners.
3. The CEU Framework
It has long and widely been recognized that a fundamental distinction should be made between
two types of decision problems in the face of uncertainty. In the rst the uncertainty is about
events that are considered to be of a familiar type. The second type of uncertainty concerns
situations in which the decision maker has no experiences of himself or others to rely on.
Following the discussion of Knight (1921), the former situations are usually referred to as
9situations of risk, the latter as situations of ambiguity. 16
We use the Schmeidler (1989)-framework to represent ambiguity, i.e., we assume agents
maximize their expected payo¤ with respect to non-additive probabilities. Non-additive prob-
abilities, also called capacities, represent the ambiguity an agent faces about the relative fre-
quencies with which outcomes are likely to occur. To evaluate the expected utility of an agent,
we take the Choquet integral of his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index with respect to
the capacity.
A capacity  over S is convex if for any events A;B  S we have 17
(A) + (B)  (A [B) + (A \B):
A capacity is additive if for any A;B in the above, equality holds. An additive capacity
is a probability distribution over S:
The concept of the ambiguity level of an event is introduced in Dow and Werlang (1992).
It measures the ambiguity as the amount of the total mass of 1 that is assigned neither to the
event, nor to its complement. The ambiguity level of a capacity  at an event E  S is
	(E) := 1  (S n E)  (E):
For convex capacities, ambiguity levels attain non-negative values only. In the case of additivity
the ambiguity level is 0.
Given a (convex) capacity  that describes the non-additive probabilities assigned to the
di¤erent events E  S; we evaluate the expected value of a function by applying the Choquet
integral. 18 If a decision-makers beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, then he puts
more weight on bad outcomes than an expected utility maximiser would.
As an example consider a capacity  and an ambiguous event E, i.e. 	(E) > 0: Let
u(s) = u1 for states s 2 E and u(s) = u2 for the remaining states s 2 SnE:
For u1 > u2 the Choquet integral of u with respect to  equals
u1  (E) + u2  [1  (E)]
= u1  (E) + u2  (SnE) + u2 	(E):
16Sometimes referred to as Knightian Uncertainty.
17For the denition of a capacity see Appendix, Denition 1.
18For a denition of the Choquet Integral see Appendix, Denition 2.
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For u1 < u2; we obtain
u1  (E) + u2  (SnE) + u1 	(E):
In each case, the bad outcome is over-weightedby the ambiguity level 	(E) of the ambigu-
ous event E:
Due to the Choquet integral it is meaningful to speak of maximizing expected utility
when beliefs are represented as capacities. The resulting theory of individual decision making
is known as Choquet Expected Utility (henceforth CEU). We now turn to games in which
players face ambiguity about the strategy choices of the other players.
A game can be interpreted as a set of interconnected optimization problems, in which the
equilibrium concept ensures the consistency of the strategy choices and beliefs of the players.
So, one may think, it should not pose too many problems to extend CEU-decision theory to
games. Unfortunately, things are not this easy. In the context of individual decision making,
the ambiguity is about the states of nature. In games, ambiguity may be about the strategy
choices of the other players as well.
Natural generalizations of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies to CEU-games use the
concept of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs. 19 Consider a normal form game, which consists
of a set of players I: The basic idea is that an equilibrium in this game is a prole of strategies
and (non-additive) beliefs (si ; 

i )i2I , such that for each player i :
20
 the equilibrium strategy si is a best response given his belief i about the strategy
choices s i := (s1; : : : ; si 1; si+1; : : : ; sn) of the other players and
 the capacity i represents a situation where player i believeshis opponents will use
the prole of equilibrium strategies s i.
We interpret believess i as meaning s

 i lies in the support of 

i .
21 For the special case
of additive beliefs, the support should exclude the states that occur with probability zero.
19This concept is introduced in one form or another in, e.g., Dow and Werlang (1994), Marinacci (2000) and
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000). Alternative notions of equilibrium under uncertainty have been developed by,
e.g., Epstein (1997), Groes et.al. (1998), Klibano¤ (1996) and Lo (1996).
20For a formal denition of an equilibrium in non-additive beliefs see Appendix, Denition 4.
21For a formal denition of support see Appendix, Denition 3 .
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This equilibrium concept generalizes Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 22 Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies is a restriction of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (or in an
interpretation that is more appropriate in our context in mixed beliefs) to those equilibria in
which only pure strategies (pure beliefs) are used. So we face the question what restriction on
capacities is the proper CEU-counterpart of the restriction to pure strategies.
As the generalization of pure strategies to CEU-games we consider capacities that have a
unique singleton support. If S is nite, the support of  equals the set of points that have
positive mass. A capacity which has the event fsg as its unique support is called a pure
belief with centre s: Every event that contains the centre of the pure belief has a positive
mass. Any event that does not contain this centre has mass zero. 23
As pure beliefs are introduced to be the non-additive counterparts of pure strategies, an
equilibrium in pure beliefs is obtained as an equilibrium in non-additive beliefs, where the
non-additive beliefs are restricted to being pure. As a consequence, a combination of strategies
and beliefs (si ; 

i )i2I is an equilibrium in pure beliefs if the belief of every player is pure and
has the strategy choices of the other players as its centre. 24 25
We interpret an equilibrium in pure beliefs as describing a situation in which player i
believes that any other player j will play strategy sj but does not have full condence in
this belief. This lack of condence is represented by the non-additivity of player is belief. 26
4. The Entrepreneurial Sharing Rule
4.1. The Partnerships Model. Our model has n  2 agents, who cooperate in a part-
nership. Each agent k = 1; : : : ; n chooses an e¤ort level 0  sk  2; where sk is a multiple of
a given rational number  = 1r with r 2 N: 27
For any e¤ort level sk his corresponding cost is ck(sk):We assume ck is a strictly increasing,
22Apart from allowing for non-additive beliefs, this solution concept does not require a player to believe that
his opponents act independently.
23For a formal denition of a pure belief, see Appendix, Denition 5.
24For a formal denition of equilibrium in pure beliefs, see Appendix, Denion 6.
25This concept of equilibrium is used in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002).
26As is well-known Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist. This is also the case for Equilibrium
in pure beliefs as is show in Appendix, Example 1.
27To ensure there is a nontrivial moral hazard problem even though we restrict attention to a nite number
of e¤ort levels, we assume that  is su¢ ciently smallto allow for a su¢ ciently closeapproximation of the
e¤ort levels in the continuous case. See Appendix, Assumption 4.
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strictly convex and di¤erentiable function with ck(0) = 0 and c0k(1) = 1: This implies ck(1) < 1:
For the analysis in this paper, we assume that each agent has the same cost of e¤ort function
c.
The production of the partnership for the e¤ort levels (s1; : : : ; sn) is given by their sum




A sharing rule assigns each agent a possibly negative share of the production of the
partnership, such that the budget balance condition holds. 28 I.e. the total production ' is
always shared amongst the partners. We assume that there are no binding limited liability
constraints on the partnership.
In the absence of ambiguity, the utility level obtained by agent k for given e¤ort levels
(s1; : : : ; sn) equals his share in the total production minus his e¤ort costs. In the presence of
ambiguity, his non-additive belief k also plays a role in determining his utility. Instead of
his share in the total output, he considers its Choquet expected value according to his belief.
He now chooses his e¤ort level to maximize the Choquet expected value of his share in the
production minus his cost of e¤ort. 29
In the absence of ambiguity an outcome, i.e., a prole of e¤ort levels, is e¢ cient if there
is no combination of e¤ort levels and a lump-sum redistribution of output that increases the
utility of one partner without decreasing the utility of any other. In the context of our model,
such e¢ ciency is obtained when the sum of the utilities is maximized. In the absence of
ambiguity, the e¢ cient e¤ort level of each agent equals one.
Accordingly, an outcome is ex-ante (ex-post) e¢ cient when it maximizes the sum of the
ex-ante (ex-post) utilities. A failure to obtain ex-post e¢ ciency indicates that ambiguity leads
to equilibrium e¤ort choices in the partnership that di¤er from the e¢ cient ones in its absence.
Ex-ante e¢ ciency, in addition, takes the ex-ante utility losses due to ambiguity aversion into
account. 30
As a point of reference, one may wish to consider partnerships with a linear sharing rule,
28For a formal denition see Appendix, To Section 4.
29For a formal representation see Appendix, To Section 3.
30When comparing two sharing rules, dominance according to ex-ante e¢ ciency does not imply dominance
according to ex-post e¢ ciency. Neither does the reverse hold.
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where the agents may have di¤ering cost functions. For such partnerships, the presence of
ambiguity does not change the equilibrium e¤ort levels. The intuition is that for any given
partner, even though the total benet from the partnership is perceived as ambiguous, there
is no ambiguity concerning either the marginal cost or the marginal benet, the latter being
constant due to the linearity of both the production function and the sharing rule. Hence, the
optimal choice of e¤ort is not a¤ected by introducing ambiguity. 31
4.2. Entrepreneurial sharing rules. We introduce a class of sharing rules which exploit
strategic ambiguity to reduce the moral hazard problem. We propose to treat partner 1 (the
entrepreneur) di¤erently from the other partners j = 2; : : : ; n (the workers), whereas the
workers are treated equally: The sharing rules (f1; (fj)j=2;:::;n) depend on a ne G  0 and
take the following form. For total production ' the pay-out to the entrepreneur equals:
f1(') :=

'  (n  1) if '  1
(n  1) G+ ' if ' 2 [0; 1)
and each worker obtains:
fj(') :=

1 if '  1
 G if ' 2 [0; 1):
We refer to (f1; (fj)j=2;:::;n) as an entrepreneurial sharing rule. Its interpretation is as
follows. When the total output ' is at least 1, the entrepreneur receives the di¤erence between
the output and the wages of the workers. If the output exceeds n  1 he makes a prot. If it
falls short of n 1 to any amount that does not imply that all workers must have shirked, then
the entrepreneur alone is liable for the shortfall. Since he obtains the production, but must pay
each worker one unit of output, he incurs a loss. If the production of the partnership indicates
that every worker must have shirked, then each worker pays the ne G: The entrepreneur
obtains both the output and the nes. 32
In the absence of ambiguity, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists for entrepreneurial
sharing rules. The only serious candidate for an equilibrium has a total supply of 1 unit of
e¤ort. If the entrepreneur provides zero e¤ort, he can improve by providing 1 unit, to increase
31A similar result holds for sharing rules with a budget breaker. For a formal proof, we refer to Kelsey and
Spanjers (1997, Prop. 12).
32 In reality the ne may correspond to a penalty such as losing promotion prospects.
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the production from 1 to 2. On the other hand, if he provides a positive amount of e¤ort while
the output equals 1, he can improve by reducing his e¤ort by the minimal amount . The
output would drop from 1 to 1  and the entrepreneur would not have to pay the workers:
Rather, he receives the ne G from each of them, as well as the output 1  : Therefore, no
equilibrium with a production of 1 exists.
5. An Example
5.1. The Partnership. The partners A and B cooperate in a partnership where each of
them has the e¤ort levels 0; 1 and 2 to choose from. The production function is '(sA; sB) :=
sA+ sB: For each agent the cost of e¤ort is given by c(s) := 23s
3
2 : The highest surplus that can
be implemented in the absence of ambiguity is 13 ; whereas the e¢ cient outcome is obtained at
a surplus of 23 : The latter requires that both agents put in an e¤ort of 1: Side payments are
allowed for and neither partner faces constraints caused by limited liability.




'  1 if '  1
2 if ' = 0
fB(') :=

1 if '  1
 2 if ' = 0:
Thus, partner A is an entrepreneur and partner B is the worker employed by him. As long
as it cannot be proven that the worker shirked, he receives a wage of 1 and the entrepreneur
bears the costs of any shortfall of the output target. If the output equals 0; the worker must
have shirked and he pays a ne of 2:
5.2. The Worker. Consider the pay-o¤s of the worker. For given belief B, his utility for
a given e¤ort level sB is the di¤erence between his Choquet expected share of total production
and his cost of e¤ort. When his belief B is pure, he believes the entrepreneur will use a pure
strategy and his Choquet expected utility equals
B(f1; 2g)  1 + [1  B(f1; 2g)]  ( 2)  c(0) = 3  B(f1; 2g)  2 if sB = 0
B(f0; 1; 2g)  1  c(sB) = 1  c(sB) if sB  1;
15
irrespective of which pure strategy the entrepreneur is believed to choose. The unique best
response of the worker is sB = 1; whenever the latter expression exceeds the former, i.e. when
1  c(1) > 3  B(f1; 2g)  2 :
Substituting c(1) = 23 and rearranging yields
B(f1; 2g) < 7
9
:
If the centre of the belief B is 0; the inequality holds since B(f1; 2g) = 0. If it is 1 or 2 we
have B(f0g) = 0 and the inequality is satised for 	B (f0g) > 29 :
Thus, the worker provides one unit of e¤ort whenever he perceives su¢ cient ambiguity
about possible shirking by the entrepreneur.
5.3. The Entrepreneur. Now we turn to the entrepreneur, partner A: When the worker
supplies one unit of e¤ort, the pure equilibrium belief A has its centre at 1: For such belief,
the Choquet expected utility of the entrepreneur is
UA(sA) :=
8<:
0 if sA = 0
A(f1; 2g)  23 if sA = 1
 0 if sA = 2:
Therefore, his unique best response is sA = 1; whenever 

A(f1; 2g) > 23 . Since the centre of
the belief is 1; we have A(f1; 2g) = 1 	A(f0g). Thus, sA = 1 is a best response whenever
	A(f0g) < 13 :
So the entrepreneur does not shirk when the worker provides one unit of e¤ort and the
entrepreneurs perceived ambiguity about possible shirking by the worker is su¢ ciently low.
5.4. Equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium in the partnership is the prole (sk;
k)k2fA;Bg such that for each partner k 2 fA;Bg we have sk = 1 and
k(E) :=
8>><>>:
0 if 1 =2 E
2 (0; 1 	k(f0g)] if E = f1g
1 	k(f0g) if E = f1; 2g
1 if E = S;
where both A(f0; 1g) and B(f0; 1g) can take arbitrary values, provided the beliefs remain
convex capacities and both 	A(f0g) < 13 and 	B (f0g) > 29 hold.
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Accordingly, the entrepreneur faces su¢ ciently little ambiguity with respect to the possible
shirking of the worker, whereas the worker perceives su¢ cient ambiguity with respect to the
e¤ort provided by the entrepreneur.
5.5. Ex-post E¢ ciency. In this partnership, there exists an ex-post e¢ cient equilibrium
with symmetric beliefs whenever 	A(f0g) = 	B (f0g) 2 (29 ; 13): Intuitively, symmetric beliefs
represent a situation where A and B both perceive the same amount of ambiguity. The
corresponding total production is '(sA; s

B) = 2 and the ex-ante equilibrium utility levels are
UA =
1
3  	A(f0g) and UB = 13 :
5.6. Ex-ante E¢ ciency. In order to obtain ex-ante e¢ ciency, we must have UA = UB =
1
3 : This holds when 	A(f0g) = 0: The entrepreneur may still face ambiguity with respect to
the e¤ort provided by the worker, but the possibility that the worker shirks no longer enters
his calculations. Amongst others, this condition is satised if the belief of the entrepreneur is
additive.
6. Equilibrium and Efficiency
The results of the example also apply to our more general model of partnerships with entre-
preneurial sharing rules. The rst result we state is that an equilibrium in pure beliefs in the
partnership exists. If the workers perceive su¢ cient ambiguity, then their best response is to
choose the e¤ort level of one, irrespective of the e¤ort provided by the other workers or the
entrepreneur. Whatever his belief, some action of the entrepreneur is a best response. The
resulting prole of e¤ort levels and beliefs constitutes an equilibrium in pure beliefs.
Theorem 1. 33 In the game induced by the entrepreneurial sharing rule, there exists an
equilibrium in pure beliefs where
(i) the ambiguity the entrepreneur faces, that the workers provided at least their planned
e¤ort, is su¢ ciently small and
(ii) the ambiguity of each worker, regarding the event that the other partners (including the
entrepreneur) provide any e¤ort at all, is su¢ ciently large.
33For a formal and slightly more general representation of the Theorem see Appendix, Theorem 5.
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In every equilibrium in pure beliefs with (i) and (ii), all partners provide the e¢ cient levels
of e¤ort. 34
For any given non-negative ne and suitable restrictions on the beliefs of the agents, the
equilibrium actions are unique and equal to the e¢ cient e¤ort levels. Under these restrictions,
every equilibrium is ex-post e¢ cient. 35
Theorem 1 indicates that the ex-post e¢ cient outcome can be implemented by the part-
nership, but what about ex-ante e¢ ciency? The above result fails to take into account the
ex-ante utility loss due to ambiguity aversion. In equilibrium, the workers perceive ambiguity
about the e¤ort levels of the other agents, but they do not face ambiguity with respect to the
payment they obtain. By choosing an e¤ort level of one, any worker ensures that, independent
of the e¤ort provided by others, he obtains his wage of one. Thus, in equilibrium no worker
perceives ambiguity about his payo¤ and no ex-ante utility is lost because of it.
So the only agent who may face such a utility loss is the entrepreneur: If his belief does not
rule out the workers providing a total e¤ort less than n  1; he experiences an ex-ante loss of
utility. If he rules this possibility out, then his Choquet expected utility is not a¤ected by the
ambiguity. Ambiguity is present only out of equilibrium, where it prevents defections. But in
equilibrium it does not lead to ex-ante utility losses. Hence, ex-ante e¢ ciency is obtained. As a
special case, we nd that ex-ante e¢ ciency is achieved when the pure belief of the entrepreneur
is additive.
In some respects, the role of ambiguity is similar to that of risk in Rasmusen (1987). He
proposes to conduct a lottery in the case some of the partners shirked. When the partners
are risk-averse, this leads to an ex-post loss of utility and may therefore alleviate the moral
hazard problem. Andolfatto and Nosal (1997) argue that Rasmusens solution is not credible.
After shirking occurred, the team members will renegotiate the contract to prevent the lottery
being held. A similar argument cannot be made in the context of our model as it contains no
equivalent to Rasmusens lottery. When an agent shirks, the strategic ambiguity leads to a
34 It should be noted that the e¢ ciency result crucially depends on each worker having the same e¢ cient
e¤ort level. Thus, considering partnerships with identical agents simplies our analysis and limits our results.
35 In the absence of side payments and condence enhancing measures, the equilibrium is also coalition proof.
This is shown in Kelsey and Spanjers (1997).
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loss in utility before the production of the partnership is known. Therefore, this loss cannot
be renegotiated away afterwards.
Theorem 2. 36 If the entrepreneur perceives no ambiguity that the workers provide at least
their planned e¤ort and the belief of each worker contains su¢ cient ambiguity that the other
partners (including the entrepreneur) do not provide any e¤ort, then every equilibrium is
ex-ante e¢ cient.
Theorem 2 states that the ex-ante e¢ cient outcome of the partnership is implemented by
an entrepreneurial sharing rule. The only remaining problem is that the beliefs of the agents
fail to be identical. As indicated in, e.g., Kelsey and Nandeibam (1996), one may interpret
the capacities that represent the beliefs of the agents as describing their ambiguity aversion.
Under this interpretation, the aversion to ambiguity is a characteristic that should be part of
the description of the agents, rather than an equilibrium property. By allowing agents to have
di¤erent equilibrium beliefs, one may argue, the assumption of identical agents is implicitly
abandoned.
The following corollary states that ex-post e¢ ciency can be obtained as an equilibrium
in identical pure beliefs. Thus, any asymmetry stems from the sharing rule, i.e., from the
contract that constitutes the partnership.
Corollary 3. Consider a partnership with an entrepreneurial sharing rule. Let the ne be
su¢ ciently large. Then there exists an ex-post e¢ cient equilibrium in pure beliefs, in which
the agents have identical beliefs about the aggregate behaviour of the others.
7. Concluding Remarks
7.1. Rationality. The results we obtained rest on how ambiguity a¤ects the behaviour of
the agents. In our example, the worker provides the e¢ cient amount of e¤ort to insure himself
against potential shirking by the entrepreneur. But in equilibrium the entrepreneur does not
shirk. So the question may arise whether the results depend on a belief that is systematically
mistaken.
36For a formal and slightly more general statement of the Theorem see Appendix, Theorem 6.
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In our interpretation, this is not the case. Rather, the worker correctly believes the en-
trepreneur does not shirk, but has only limited condence in this belief. As a result he acts
cautiously and puts in e¤ort to avoid the fear of facing the penalty for shirking. Unlike the
expected utility model, our model of ambiguity is capable of distinguishing di¤erent degrees
of condence in a belief. In an equilibrium in pure beliefs the worker assumes the entrepre-
neur does not shirk. But for less than full condence, the fear that the entrepreneur may
never-the-less shirk a¤ects the workers utility level.
Another question that may arise is whether a worker with beliefs as in our model can still
be considered to be rational. The answer to this question depends upon which denition of
rationality one adopts. The agents in our model are maximizing a complete and transitive
preference, which is the standard denition of rationality. Given individuals have a dislike of
ambiguity, it is surely rational to act in a manner which reduces ones exposure to it.
In the context of choice under uncertainty, some economists would adopt the stronger
denition of rationality that only expected utility preferences are rational. It could be argued
that our model even satises this stronger denition of rationality if it is a reduced form of
a more complex model, in which individuals are acting to protect themselves against possible
mis-specications of the model. The point is argued in more detail in Kelsey and Milne (1999)
and Mukerji (1997). Intuitively, an argument for ambiguity is that it applies in situations in
which individuals do not completely understand the environment in which they are operating.
Our preferred interpretation is that ambiguity aversion implies a small amount of bounded
rationality. In our view, this is well justied both by intuition and by experimental evidence
of ambiguity aversion.
7.2. Dynamics. In an intertemporal extension of our model would beliefs tend to be con-
tradicted over time? Our key result is that cooperation is sustained by the threat of an am-
biguous punishment o¤ the equilibrium path. Since punishment never happens in equilibrium,
there is no scope to update beliefs. The ambiguous threat is never tested, hence ambiguity
does not necessarily dissipate over time. Provided the worker puts in the e¢ cient amount of
e¤ort, he gets his wages. He will never learn whether or not the entrepreneur shirked.
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So what happens if we are repeatedly in the same situation and the worker can learn
whether or not the entrepreneur shirked? A complete answer is not possible as this is an area
of current research. There has been some theoretical work on updating non-additive beliefs.
Consider a decision maker who is repeatedly faced with ambiguous urns. It has been shown
that if the decision-maker repeatedly faces with the same ambiguous urn, then eventually his
beliefs will converge to an additive probability distribution. 37 In other words, ambiguity will
decrease over time. If, however, an individual is faced with repeated choices from di¤erent
ambiguous urns, then ambiguity will persist over time. 38
We believe that economic life is more like making draws from di¤erent ambiguous urns
since it is continually posing new problems. Often it is not obvious how to relate these to
previous experience. Is the ambiguity created by Enron and World Com the same as that
created by terrorism? Was the dot.com boom similar to earlier bubbles e.g. the Australian
mineral boom in the 1960s or the 19th century railway boom? Or was it an entirely new
phenomena? Firms would also be a¤ected by local sources of ambiguity, which require very
specic information to be identied.
Some kinds of ambiguity tend to diminish over time, e.g. ambiguity about the economic
impact of computers is decreasing over time. In other situations ambiguity shows no such ten-
dency. Ambiguity concerning the stability of the nancial system does not decrease uniformly
over time. Rather it is low in normal times and is high when there is a crisis.
In light of the above arguments we believe that ambiguous threats could be used to sustain
cooperation in a consistent intertemporal model. However further research is required.
7.3. Optimism. One may argue that contrary to our assumption of pessimism, in practice
people are excessively optimistic. These two observations are not contradictory since it is
possible for both good and bad outcomes to be over-weighted at the expense of intermediate




Consider the following form of preferences
V (a) =   Efu(a(s))g+   (1  ) M(a) + (1  )  (1  ) m(a);
where M(a) := maxs2Sfu(a(s))g denotes the maximum utility and m(a) := mins2Sfu(a(s))g
the minimum utility associated with the act a: Furthermore,  reects the level of opti-
mism/pessimism, whereas  represents the level of condence in the probability assessment. 39
These preferences put more weight on both good and bad outcomes than an expected utility
maximiser would. Thus they may be described as displaying optimism and pessimism at the
same time.
People do certainly behave optimistically at times buying lottery tickets, entering risky
careers such as acting and, until recently, buying shares of new economy stocks. The degree
of optimism/pessimism depends both on the subject and on the context.
In this paper we abstracted from optimism and focused on the implications of pessimism
for sustaining cooperation. The possibility of optimism reinforces our argument, since it would
allow cooperation to be sustained by ambiguous rewards as well as ambiguous threats. This
would further expand the range of outcomes which can be implemented.
Despite this, in one sense, our paper does model an optimistic attitude of the entrepreneur.
the incentive scheme in our paper relies on the worker having a high degree of ambiguity-
aversion (or pessimism) and the entrepreneur having a low degree of ambiguity aversion. Thus
in a relative sense the entrepreneur is more optimistic. We believe this is compatible with
Knights arguments that more optimistic (i.e., less pessimistic) individuals are more willing to
face ambiguity and tend to become entrepreneurs.
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8. Appendix
This appendix contains formal statements of our denitions and results. It concludes with the
proofs of the theorems and the corollary.
TO SECTION 3
Denition 1. Let the set of states of nature be S; which we assume to be nite. Denote the
set of events (i.e., subsets of S) by (S) := fE  Sg. A function  : (S)! [0; 1] is a capacity
if it satises (;) = 0; (S) = 1, and for any A;B  S with A  B we have (A)  (B):
Denition 2. Let  be a capacity and let u : S ! be a function. Let  := (1; : : : ; jSj) be
a permutation of the states of nature such that u(1)  u(2)  : : :  u(jSj): The Choquet
integral of u with respect to  is
Z C
u d := u(1)  (f1g) +
jSjX
k=2
u(k)  [(f1; : : : ; kg)  (f1; : : : ; k 1g)]:
Denition 3. An event E  S is a support of  if (S n E) = 0 and F  E implies
(S n F ) > 0: 40 41
Denition 4. Let for each player i 2 I the capacity i : (S i) ! [0; 1] and the strategy
si 2 Si be given, where S i :=
Q




i )i2I is an equilibrium in













j ) = arg max
sj2Sj
Z C
uj(sj ; ) dj ;
is the set of best responses of player j for given belief j :
40There are several competing notions of a support of a capacity. The way the support of a capacity is dened
may inuence the set of equilibria of the game. For a discussion we refer to Haller (2000).
41 It should be noted that the support of a capacity may fail to be unique. For examples see Dow and Werlang
(1994).
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Denition 5. A capacity  : (S)! [0; 1] is a pure belief with centre s 2 S if fsg is the
unique support of : If S is nite, the support of  equals the set of points that have positive
mass.
Denition 6. Let (si ; 

i )i2I be an equilibrium such that for each player i 2 I the capacity






i )i2I is an equilibrium in pure beliefs.
Example 1. In general, an equilibrium in pure beliefs may fail to exist, as in the matching
penniesgame:
L R
U (1; 0) (0; 1)
D (0; 1) (1; 0)
For contradiction, suppose that player 1 plays U in an equilibrium in pure beliefs. Then the
equilibrium belief of player 2 has its centre at U . It follows that 2(fUg) > 0 and 2(fDg) = 0:
The Choquet expected payo¤ of player 2 when he chooses L is 2(fDg)+0  [1 2(fDg)] = 0:
For R it equals 2(fUg) + 0  [1   2(fUg)] > 0; and so the unique best response of player 2
is R: This implies that, in this equilibrium, the belief of player 1 is pure with centre R: For
such belief his unique best response is D and player 1 fails to play U: By a similar argument
it follows that in equilibrium player 1 does not play D either and therefore no equilibrium in
pure beliefs exists.
TO SECTION 4
Let r be a positive integer and denote  := 1r : Let [x; x] denote the set of all rational
numbers between x and x, which are integer multiples of : We denote (x; x); [x; x) and
(x; x] accordingly.
Let each agent k 2 N := f1; : : : ; ng choose an e¤ort level from the set Sk := [0; 2]: The
production of the partnership for the e¤ort levels s := (s1; : : : ; sn) 2 S :=
Q





A sharing rule is a prole (gk)k2N of functions that assign each agent a (possibly negative)
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share of the production of the partnership, such that the budget balance condition holds,
i.e., for each ' 2 [0; 2n] we have
P
k2N gk(') = ':
In the absence of ambiguity, the utility level obtained by agent k for a given prole of





gk('(sk; s k))dk   c(sk):
We denote [t;!) := [t; 2(n  1)]: For notational convenience, we introduce the capacity
ek : ([0;!))! [0; 1]; which denotes the mass k assigns to the event that the total e¤ort of
the agents other than k is in some set E: So for each E  [0;!) we have
ek(E) := k(fs k 2 S kj X
j2Nnfkg
sj 2 Eg):
Assumption 4. For c and  we have that

n < c(1)  c(1 ):
Assumption 4 states that  is su¢ ciently small to allow for a su¢ ciently close ap-
proximation of the e¤ort levels in the continuous case. 42
TO SECTION 6
For proofs, see the subsequent section of this appendix.
Theorem 5. 43 In the game induced by the entrepreneurial sharing rule, there exists an
equilibrium in pure beliefs ((sk)k2N ; (

k)k2N ); with
(i) 	e1([es 1;!)) < 1  1  [c(1)  c(1 )];
where es 1 := nP
j=2
sj and
(ii) 	j (f0 jg) >
c(1)
G+1 for each j 2 J ,
where 0 j denotes each partner other than j choosing e¤ort level 0:





43 In a stronger but less accessible formulation, the theorem generalizes to continuous strategy spaces by
letting ! 0; without imposing 	e1 ([es1;!)) = 0:
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Moreover, in every equilibrium in pure beliefs with (i) and (ii), all partners provide the e¢ cient
levels of e¤ort.
Theorem 6. Let the belief 1 of agent 1 be pure such that if s 1 2 S 1 is the centre of
1 then 	e1([es 1;!)) = 0: Let the belief j of each j 2 J be restricted to be pure with
	j (f0 jg) > c(1)G+1 . Then every equilibrium is ex-ante e¢ cient.
PROOFS TO SECTION 6
Lemma 7. Let j 2 J and let j represent the pure belief of agent j. Let j be such that for
the ambiguity level of f0 jg we have 	j (f0 jg) > c(1)G+1 . Then the (unique) best response of
agent j is sj = 1:
Proof of Lemma 7
(i) sj = 1:
For sj = 1; we have for the Choquet expected utility of agent j thatZ C
fj('(1 j ; sj))dj   c(sj) = 1  c(1);
where 1 j denotes each partner other than j choosing e¤ort level 1:
(ii) sj < 1:
For given sj < 1; and G  0 we can make the Choquet expected utility of agent jZ C
fj('(1 j ; sj))dj   c(sj)
smaller than 1 c(1) by choosing 	j (f0 jg) su¢ ciently large (but, of course, less than 1). To
see this, note that 	j (f0 jg) = 1  j(f0 jg)  j(S j n f0 jg): By denition,  j is a pure
belief, so if its centre is s j 6= 0 j ; we have j(f0 jg) = 0 and j(S jnf0 jg) = 1 	j (f0 jg):
Note that:
Z C
fj('(1 j ; sj))dj   c(sj)  [1 	j (f0 jg)]  1 + [	j (f0 jg)]  ( G)  0:
29
By choosing 	j (f0 jg) > c(1)G+1 , the expected utility of agent j becomes less than 1  c(1).
If j is pure with centre s j = 0 j ; then j(S j n f0 jg) = 0: It follows that the weight of
the outcome  G in the Choquet integral is 	j (f0 jg) = 1   j(S j n f0 jg) = 1; and the
Choquet expected utility of agent j is less than 1  c(1):
(iii) sj > 1:
The Choquet expected utility of agent j for sj = 1+ t  > 1 for any integer t > 0 equals, by
a similar argument,Z C
fj('(1 j ; 1 + t ))dj   c(1 + t ) = 1  c(1 + t ) < 1  c(1):
Therefore, sj = 1 is the unique best response of agent j.
Lemma 8. Let the capacity 1 represent the belief of agent 1. Let 1 be pure with centre
1 1; where 1 1 denotes each partner other than 1 choosing e¤ort level 1: Let the ambiguity
level 	e1([n  1;!)) < 1  1  (c(1)  c(1 )). Then the (unique) best response of agent
1 is s1 = 1:
Proof of Lemma 8
Since 1 is a pure belief at 1 1 by assumption, we have that for each A 2 (S 1) with 1 1 =2 A
that 1(A) = 0: In particular, 1(S 1 n f1 1g) = 0:
Since 	e1([n   1;!)) := 1   e1([n   1;!))   e1([0; n   1)) is assumed to be less than
1  1  (c(1)  c(1 )); we have e1([n  1;!)) > 1  (c(1)  c(1 )):
(i) s1 < 1:
The di¤erence in the Choquet expected utility of agent 1 for choosing the e¤ort level of 1
instead of s1 < 1 is at least
e1([n  1;!))  c(1)  e1([n  1;!))  s1 + c(s1)
> 1  (c(1)  c(s1))  (1  s1)  c(1) + c(s1)
 1  (c(1)  c(1 ))  (1  (1 ))  c(1) + c(1 ) = 0
by using c0(1) = 1; the strict convexity of c and the structure of the sharing rule. So s1 < 1 is
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not a best response.
(ii) s1 > 1:
For this case; we have by c0(1) = 1; the strict convexity of c and by the structure of the sharing
rule, that the di¤erence in Choquet expected utility for choosing the e¤ort level of s1 = 1+
instead of 1 is at most
1 +   c(1 + )  1 + c(1) = + c(1)  c(1 + ) < 0;
since we have c(1 + )  c(1) > :
Therefore, we have that for 	e1([n  1;!)) < 1  1  (c(1)  c(1 + )) the unique best
response of agent 1 is s1 = 1:
Proof of Theorem 5
For each j 2 J let j be a pure belief such that the ambiguity level 	j (f0 jg) >
c(1)
G+1 . Then
sj = 1 is the (unique) best response. By Lemma 7, such 

j exists.
For every pure belief 1 with centre 1 1 some s1 exists that maximizesZ C
f1('(1 1; s1))d1   c(s1):
The combination ((sk)k2N ; (

k)k2N ) is an equilibrium in the game induced by the sharing rule:
Let (sk; 

k) be such an equilibrium.
Since 	j (f0 jg) >
c(1)
G+1 , it follows from Lemma 7 that for each j 2 J we have sj = 1:
Since (sk; 

k) is an equilibrium, 

1 is a pure belief at 1 1: By assumption of the theorem,
	e1([es 1;!)) < 1   1  [c(1)   c(1   )]; so it follows from Lemma 8, that s1 = 1: This
completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
According to Theorem 5 we have in equilibrium that 8k 2 N : sk = 1: So it remains to show
that the Choquet expected utility for each agent k 2 N equals 1  c(1):
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For agent 1; we have
Z C
f1('(s 1; 1))d1   c(1) = 1  [e1([es 1;!i))  1(;)]  c(1) = 1  c(1):
For any agent j 2 J we have
Z C
fj('(s j ; 1))dj   c(1) = 1  [j (S j)  j (;)]  c(1) = 1  c(1);
which proves the theorem.
Proof of Corollary 3
Suppose 8 k 2 N : ek = e: For the equilibrium to be ex-post e¢ cient, the assumption of
Theorem 5 requires with respect to agent 1 that 	e([es 1;!)) < 1  1 [c(1) c(1 )]: Since
the belief is pure with centre 1 k; this is equivalent to e([n  1;!)) > 1  [c(1)  c(1 )]:
For the agents in J , we must have 	(f0 kg) > c(1)G+1 : Since the beliefs are pure with centre
1 k; this holds whenever e((0;!)) < 1  c(1)G+1 :
Denote a1 := e(fn   1g) and a2 := e([n   1;!)): Let e((0;!)) = a1 < 1   c(1)G+1 and
a2 >
1
  [c(1)  c(1 )]: Denition 1 requires that a1 = e(fn  1g) < e((0;!)) = a2: For




0 if n  1 =2 E
a1 if n  1 2 E + [n  1;!)
a2 if S 6= E  [n  1;!)
1 if E = S:
satises both conditions of Theorem 5 and is convex since
e([n  1;!)) + e((0;!))  e(S) + e(fn  1g):
